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Abstract
Biocontainment systems that couple environmental sensing with circuit-based control of cell 
viability could be used to prevent escape of genetically modified microbes into the environment. 
Here we present two engineered safe-guard systems: the Deadman and Passcode kill switches. The 
Deadman kill switch uses unbalanced reciprocal transcriptional repression to couple a specific 
input signal with cell survival. The Passcode kill switch uses a similar two-layered transcription 
design and incorporates hybrid LacI/GalR family transcription factors to provide diverse and 
complex environmental inputs to control circuit function. These synthetic gene circuits efficiently 
kill Escherichia coli and can be readily reprogrammed to change their environmental inputs, 
regulatory architecture and killing mechanism.
With the advent of synthetic biology, genetically modified microorganisms have been 
increasingly used for biomedical, industrial and environmental applications1–6. Deployment 
of these engineered microbes in large scales and open environments calls for the 
development of safe and secure means to restrain their proliferation. Pioneering 
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biocontainment systems used metabolic auxotrophy in which target cells could only grow in 
the presence of an exogenously supplied metabolite7,8, and the recent creation of an E. coli 
strain with an altered genetic code enabled production of synthetic auxotrophy strains in 
which an exogenous supply of non-natural amino acids is required for cell survival9,10. 
Traditional metabolic auxotrophy strains are hampered by the potential for inadvertent 
complementation by crossfeeding or by the presence of the metabolite in heterogenous 
environments, and synthetic auxotrophy systems rely on extensive genome-wide engineering 
that may be impractical for many industrial production and biotherapeutic microbes. 
Furthermore, they are intrinsically difficult to reprogram for different environmental 
conditions, potentially limiting their application. An alternative approach to biocontainment 
is to use gene circuits to maintain essential gene expression or block toxin gene expression 
under the assigned biocontainment conditions7,11–14. Upon loss of the biocontainment 
signal, the circuit blocks essential gene expression or induces toxin gene expression to kill 
the cell. These circuits offer the promise of complex environmental signal integration but are 
hindered by a relative lack of programmable environment sensors to enable their use under 
non-laboratory conditions15.
Here we design and construct two programmable biocontainment circuits in E. coli – a 
Deadman kill switch that uses a transcription-based monostable toggle design to provide 
rapid and robust target cell killing, and a Passcode circuit that uses hybrid LacI/GalR family 
transcription factors (TFs) to construct complex environmental requirements for cell 
survival. We use a tripartite strategy of TF protein engineering to detect diverse input 
signals, robust circuit design to provide signal processing, and redundant toxin-induced and 
protease-mediated cell killing mechanisms. The resulting biocontainment systems are 
modular, flexible and extensible, and should prove useful across many industrial and 
biotherapeutic applications.
RESULTS
Deadman circuit development
We developed the Deadman kill switch to serve as a passively activated biocontainment 
system for engineered microbes. Similar to pioneering biocontainment systems in E. coli12 
and Pseudomonas putida16, the Deadman circuit uses a small molecule binding transcription 
factor to produce a “survival” state in which repression of toxin production is linked to the 
presence of a specific environmental signal. Upon loss of the environmental signal, the 
circuit switches to the “death” state in which de-repressed toxin production kills the cell. To 
increase the robustness of these biocontainment states, the Deadman circuit uses a genetic 
“toggle switch” architecture in which reciprocal repression by the LacI and TetR 
transcription factors form transcription states that are maintained by the circuit’s linked 
feedback loops17,18 (Supplementary Results, Supplementary Fig. 1). To create a circuit in 
which the “death” state is dominant in the absence of the survival signal, we altered the 
ribosome binding site (RBS) strengths of LacI and TetR to favor TetR expression in a single-
copy plasmid (Supplementary Fig. 2 and Online Methods). In the resulting monostable 
circuit, the presence of the TetR inhibitor anhydrotetracycline (ATc) is required to maintain 
the circuit in the subordinate LacI+ “survival” state (Supplementary Fig. 3). Incorporation of 
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toxin genes into the TetR+ state creates a kill switch where the presence of ATc is required 
to block toxin expression and cell death.
We included additional palindromic LacI operator sites in the toxin gene promoter to 
minimize leaky toxin expression19 and introduced a transcriptional terminator upstream of 
the promoter to insulate the gene from spurious transcription (Supplementary Fig. 4). To 
accelerate the circuit’s switching dynamics, we fused a degradation tag to the C-terminus of 
LacI that is specifically recognized by mf-Lon20, a heterologous protease under control of a 
LacI-dependent promoter (Supplementary Fig. 5a). Upon removal of ATc, TetR repression 
of lacI allows expression of mf-Lon, which targets LacI for degradation to create a positive 
feedback loop that accelerates the switch to the TetR+ state (Supplementary Fig. 5b). 
Importantly, single-cell analysis of these circuits by flow cytometry showed a monomodal 
distribution of cells in the LacI+ and TetR+ state, demonstrating stable circuit expression 
across the cell population (see 0 and 6 hour data in Supplementary Fig. 5c).
Deadman kill switch characterization
To identify an efficient mechanism to kill the host cells upon circuit activation, we tested 
several toxin genes that directly damage the host cell’s DNA or RNA. We chose to test the 
endonuclease ecoRI21, the DNA gyrase inhibitor ccdB22 and the ribonuclease-type toxin 
mazF23 because they are well-characterized, are native to E. coli, and provide a range of 
killing mechanisms. The toxin genes were independently incorporated into the Deadman 
circuit, and a range of RBS strengths were tested for each toxin to optimize cell death upon 
circuit activation24 (Supplementary Fig. 6). Upon removal of ATc, the toxins produced 3–5 
logs of killing within 6 hours as measured by colony forming units (CFUs) (Fig. 1a). To 
increase the robustness of the circuit and provide an independent method of circuit-
dependent cell death, we used mf-Lon protease to not only degrade LacI but also target 
essential proteins for degradation (Fig. 1b). We attached the mf-Lon degradation tag pdt#1 to 
the 3’ end of five essential genes whose protein products are particularly sensitive to mf-Lon 
degradation20, and we then measured cell viability following removal of ATc (Fig. 1b). 
Among the tested essential gene targets, the peptidoglycan biosynthesis gene murC provided 
the strongest and fastest cell death phenotype (survival ratio < 1 × 10−4 within 6 hours).
To determine if the toxin- and mf-Lon-mediated killing mechanisms produce synergistic 
effects, we created Deadman circuits containing each of the toxins in combination with the 
mf-Lon-MurC targeting module (Fig. 1c). In each instance, the combinatorial approach 
provided more effective biocontainment, and in particular, coordinated EcoRI expression 
and mf-Lon-mediated MurC degradation resulted in cell killing below the limit of detection 
(survival ratio < 1 × 10−7) 6 hours after removal of ATc (Fig. 1c). Furthermore, the Deadman 
circuit’s design provides an additional fail-safe mechanism which bypasses the circuit’s 
sensor system to directly activate toxin expression to cause cell death. Direct derepression of 
the subordinate TF, in this case derepression of LacI with isopropyl β-D-1-
thiogalactopyranoside (IPTG), activates toxin production and cell death irrespective of the 
presence of the programmed survival signal (Fig. 2).
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Hybrid transcription factor design
To extend the versatility and modularity of this system, we built a second circuit, called the 
Passcode circuit, which uses hybrid LacI/GalR family TFs to expand the range and 
complexity of environmental signals used to define biocontainment conditions. This survival 
“passcode” can be easily reprogrammed to restrict cell growth to a new environment or to 
limit knowledge of the growth conditions to authorized personnel. To build hybrid LacI 
family TFs, we first identified the boundaries of the environmental sensing modules (ESMs) 
and DNA recognition modules (DRMs) found in LacI family members (Supplementary Figs. 
7–11). Similar to previous studies25,26, we generated hybrid TFs that use the small molecule 
input defined by the hybrid’s ESM to regulate the promoter defined by the hybrid’s DRM 
(Fig. 3a and Supplementary Fig. 12).
To construct the hybrid TFs, we used the cellobiose-responsive TF, CelR, from 
Thermobifida fusca and the galactose-responsive TF, GalR, and IPTG-responsive LacI from 
E. coli. We fused the ESMs from CelR and GalR to the DRM of LacI to generate the hybrid 
TFs CelR-LacI and GalR-LacI. To test their functionality, these hybrid TFs or native LacI 
were used to control GFP expression from a promoter containing lacO operator sites 
recognized by the LacI DRM. The hybrid TFs allowed strong GFP expression upon 
exposure to the small molecule input defined by their ESM and showed almost no response 
to the other inputs (Supplementary Figs. 11b and 12b). We fused the LacI, GalR and CelR 
ESMs to the DRM of ScrR from Klebsiella pneumoniae and used the resulting hybrid TFs to 
regulate a promoter containing scrO operator sites. As predicted from their design, these 
hybrid TFs only respond to the input defined by their ESM (Supplementary Figs. 11b and 
12c), although it is interesting to note that the GalR ESM shows distinct inhibition by high 
levels of IPTG as previously reported27 (Supplementary Fig. 13). Importantly, the DRMs 
used in these hybrid TFs provided similar specificity, as they regulated promoters containing 
their cognate operator sites but not other LacI family operator sites (Supplementary Fig. 14). 
Similar to previous work27, we found that co-expression of hybrid TFs containing the same 
DRM could be used to regulate a single promoter, creating an AND logic gate function 
(Supplementary Fig. 15).
Development of the Passcode kill switches
We used these hybrid TFs to create a series of Passcode circuits that contain a single 
transcriptional architecture but respond to distinct combinations of environmental inputs to 
control gene expression and cell survival. The Passcode circuits contain the output module 
(in this case, gfp) under control of a TF (hybrid C) whose expression is controlled by an 
AND gate formed by two TFs (hybrid A and hybrid B) (Supplementary Fig. 16). This serial 
arrangement, made possible by the orthogonality of the hybrid DRMs and ESMs, creates the 
condition that both of the inducers recognized by hybrid A and hybrid B (inputs a and b, 
respectively) must be present to allow expression of hybrid C to repress gfp expression. Loss 
of input a or input b or the presence of input c allows gfp expression, causing cell death if 
gfp is replaced by a toxin gene.
To test the functionality and modularity of this circuit architecture, we created three versions 
of the Passcode circuit that respond to different combinations of input signals to control 
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output expression (Fig. 3a). For example, in one Passcode circuit (Fig. 3b, left column), we 
used GalR-LacI (A) and CelR-LacI (B) to control expression of LacI-ScrR (C), which in 
turn represses toxin expression. In this circuit, loss of galactose (input a) or cellobiose (input 
b) allows GalR-LacI or CelR-LacI to bind the lacO operator, blocking LacI-ScrR expression, 
thereby enabling toxin expression and causing cell death. Any exposure to IPTG (input c) 
releases LacI-ScrR repression of toxin expression, thereby killing the cell as well. 
Importantly, the passcode combinations for cell survival and cell death can be reprogrammed 
simply by rearranging the ESMs of the three TFs to rewire the connections between the 
environmental sensing and transcriptional regulation.
These Passcode circuits were first evaluated with GFP as the output module in all eight 
combinations of the three environmental inputs. All three circuits allowed high level GFP 
expression in all conditions except that designated by the desired three input combination 
(Supplementary Fig. 16b), and single-cell fluorescence showed a monomodal population 
distribution under all conditions (Supplementary Fig. 16c). GFP was then replaced with the 
ecoRI and mf-Lon-MurC toxin modules described for the Deadman switch above (Fig. 3a), 
and toxin expression levels were optimized by testing a range of calculated RBS strengths24 
(Supplementary Fig. 17). Hybrid C, which directly controls toxin expression in the circuit, 
was also engineered in the same manner to optimize circuit performance (see Online 
Methods). Each kill switch circuit was tested in E. coli using eight combinations of input 
signals, and cell survival was measured by CFU count at multiple time points 
(Supplementary Fig. 18). As seen in Fig. 3b, only circuits that received the proper survival 
code allowed the host cells to survive (each survival condition is highlighted in green). 
Furthermore, inclusion of both the ecoRI and mf-Lon toxin modules in the Passcode circuit 
caused the cell survival ratio to drop below 1×10−6 for all non-passcode conditions.
Long-term circuit stability
To measure the long-term stability and robustness of the Passcode and Deadman kill 
switches, we passaged cells containing the circuits for four days under survival conditions 
and periodically tested subsets of cells for circuit function under non-permissive conditions. 
Both the Deadman and Passcode circuits showed reduced killing efficiency over time, and 
sequence analysis of cells that escaped biocontainment predominantly showed inactivating 
mutations in the toxin genes (Fig. 4 and Supplementary Figs. 19–21). The noted exception 
was independent TetR mutations in the two-toxin Deadman circuit where TetR inactivation 
repressed toxin expression even in the absence of the ATc survival signal. It is important to 
note, however, that these “escapees” are still sensitive to IPTG-mediated fail-safe circuit 
activation as described above (Fig. 2). Genome-encoded insertion-sequence (IS) elements28, 
particularly IS1 and IS5, caused a large percentage of inactivating mutations in the one-toxin 
and two-toxin Passcode circuits. Deletion of these IS elements and other genome repair 
mechanisms in E. coli reduced the Passcode “escapee” rate by 3–5 logs after four days, 
demonstrating that increased stability of the host genome will augment the functionality of 
these biocontainment systems (Fig. 4b and Supplementary Fig. 19). As the toxin genes were 
the main target for circuit inactivation, inclusion of additional redundant killing systems into 
each circuit should further reduce the escapee rate.
Chan et al. Page 5
Nat Chem Biol. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 June 07.
H
H
M
I A
uthor M
an
u
script
H
H
M
I A
uthor M
an
u
script
H
H
M
I A
uthor M
an
u
script
DISCUSSION
The Deadman and Passcode switches provide robust information processing circuits to 
couple environmental signals with conditional survival of the microbial host. The Deadman 
kill switch described above is based on a monostable circuit that passively activates toxin 
gene expression in the absence of the small molecule input ATc. Since ATc is not normally 
found in nature, engineered cells that escape biocontainment will trigger cell death to 
prevent the spread of the organism or its genetic content into the surrounding ecosystem. 
Unlike auxotrophy-based biocontainment where the environmental signal is an intrinsic 
feature of the system9,10, the environmental sensing and cell killing systems are decoupled 
in the Deadman switch. This circuit relies on two main elements for functionality: (1) the 
orthogonality of the TFs to create a toggle switch, and (2) their relative activity under 
induced expression. As such, the Deadman circuit is highly modular, and the environmental 
signal detected by the circuit may be altered by replacing TetR with a wide range of 
transcription factors, including more than 80,000 annotated TetR family members29 as well 
as orthogonal LacI/GalR family members including hybrid TFs as described for the 
Passcode switch. In addition, the Deadman circuit has an additional fail-safe mechanism 
which activates toxin production and cell death in the presence of IPTG, enabling exogenous 
control over the microbe’s survival even as the cell uses the circuit to monitor its 
environment.
Similar to the Deadman switch, the Passcode circuits are based on a two-layered 
transcriptional repression design. To build hybrid TFs, we identified the conserved 
boundaries of the ESMs and DRMs within the LacI/GalR family members LacI, GalR, CelR 
and ScrR. The resulting environmental sensing and DNA binding modules provide 
independent control of the sensory input and regulatory output of each hybrid TF. Previous 
pioneering work used the boundary between the conserved regulatory domain and HH motif 
to create hybrid TFs25,26, but some of these hybrids required additional protein engineering 
and mutagenesis to become functional. Here we identify a discrete boundary between the 
conserved HH and HTH motifs to create independent environmental sensory and DNA 
binding domains that can be efficiently combined without further protein engineering. The 
modularity provided by these hybrid TFs dramatically expands the number and range of 
environmental signals that can be used to control biocontainment systems such as the 
Deadman and Passcode circuits described here, as the ESM and DRM boundaries defined in 
this study may be used to incorporate sensing modules from many of the ~29,000 LacI/GalR 
family members30 that detect diverse environmental signals.
These hybrid TFs may also be used to functionalize other synthetic circuits, including the 
Deadman switch, to respond to different environmental signals. Moreover, the regular use of 
LacI and TetR in other bacteria31,32 suggests that these circuits may be readily transferred to 
other microbes, including industrial production strains. Replacement of the antibiotic 
resistance cassettes in these plasmids with well characterized selection systems that use 
toxin-antitoxin modules or auxotrophy complementation should also enable their use in 
biotherapeutic applications4,33.
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In summary, we have established two circuit-based microbial kill switches that constrict host 
cell survival to an environment defined by specific input signals. Unlike existing 
biocontainment systems with fixed survival conditions that are difficult to modify, the 
Deadman and Passcode kill switches are inherently customizable, both in the environmental 
conditions that control circuit activation and in the output modules that control cell fate. In 
addition to its use as a biocontainment system, the Passcode circuit may find particular 
utility as a tool for intellectual property protection, where unauthorized growth of strains 
without the appropriate “passcode” molecules would induce cell death. With the proper 
choice of toxins, such as the endonuclease EcoRI described here, the Passcode circuit could 
be used to not only kill the host cell but also degrade its genome and accompanying 
plasmids to deter attempts at reverse-engineering the strain of interest. Use of hybrid TFs 
that respond to proprietary small molecule inputs may further secure the strain against theft, 
even if its genome is sequenced.
ONLINE METHODS
Analysis of protein sequences and crystal structures
ClustalW235 was used for protein sequence alignment of GalS, GalR, AscG, RbsR, PurR, 
GntR, LacI, and MalI from E. coli; CelR from T. fusca; ScrR from V. alginolyticus (ScrR-
V); and ScrR from K. pneumonia (ScrR-K). Protein crystal structure analysis was performed 
with PyMol 1.5.x using Protein Data Bank (PDB) entries 1EFA, 1LBG, 1LBI, 1LBH, 1QPZ, 
and 1TLF36–40.
Strains
E. coli MG1655ΔlacI was used to perform functional analysis of hybrid TFs as shown in 
Supplementary Figures 10–13. In this strain, transcription from the pLtetO-1 promoter 
driving TF expression is constitutive because it does not contain tetR. E. coli MG1655Pro, 
which produces high levels of LacI and TetR11, was used in hybrid TF analysis when LacI 
regulation of pLlacO-1 was a desired feature (Supplementary Fig. 14). In these assays, the 
TetR inhibitor anhydrotetracycline (ATc; 100 ng/mL) was included in the media to ensure 
TF expression from the pLtetO promoter. E. coli MG1655ΔlacI was the parental strain for 
all circuit characterization and was created through P1 phage transduction of lacI::kanR 
from the Keio collection41 into E. coli MG1655 (ATCC 47076). Flp recombinase, expressed 
on pCP20, was used to remove the kanR cassette42. To construct E. coli strains containing 
mf-Lon recognition tags on the essential genes dxs, cysS, fldA, plsB or murC, the pdt#1 mf-
Lon recognition tag from each corresponding gene in the EPD library20 was transferred to 
MG1655ΔlacI by P1 phage transduction and the kanR cassette was removed as above. P1 
phage transduction was used to convert E. coli MDS42pdu34 (Scarab Genomics) for use in 
the Passcode switch analysis. Specifically, lacI::kanR and recA::kanR deletions from the 
Keio collection41 and murC-pdt#1 from the EPD library20 were independently transferred to 
MDS42pdu by P1 phage transduction, and the accompanying kanamycin cassettes were 
removed by FlpE-mediated excision using pECA102.
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Cell growth and media
Luria-Bertani (LB) media was used for all experiments, and the following antibiotics and 
inducers were included when appropriate: ampicillin (50 µg/ml), chloramphenicol (10 µg/
ml), kanamycin (50 µg/ml), ATc (100 ng/ml), IPTG (1 mM), galactose (20 mM) and 
cellobiose (5 mM). For the Deadman switch, single colonies grown on LB agar plates 
containing ATc were inoculated into liquid cultures containing ATc for growth overnight at 
37°C with shaking. Similarly, cells harboring each of the three Passcode switches were 
picked from plates with the survival combination of inputs and inoculated into their 
respective survival liquid media. Overnight cultures were inoculated 1:20,000 into 96-well 
plates and grown at 37°C and 900 rpm for further tests.
Plasmid construction
All plasmids were constructed using conventional molecular cloning protocols43 and Gibson 
Assembly44. E. coli NEB Turbo (New England BioLabs Inc.) was used for cloning purposes, 
and all primers were purchased from IDT. To create the Deadman switch pDM1 (Genbank 
accession number KT893253), genetic elements from the toggle pECJ320 were cloned into 
the conditionally amplified single-copy plasmid pBAC/oriV45, and the lacI and tetR RBS 
strengths were modified as described in the following section. To provide increased control 
over the promoter controlling mCherry expression, the T1 terminator from rnpB (Registry of 
Standard Biological Parts BBa_J61048) was inserted upstream (Supplementary Fig. 4a), and 
three palindromic lac operator sites19 were inserted around the –35 and –10 region of the 
promoter (pDM2, GenBank accession number KT893254). The M. florum protease gene 
mf-lon was cloned under control of a LacI-regulated promoter (pDM2L; GenBank accession 
number KT893255). The resulting plasmid served as the base Deadman circuit, and 
mCherry was cloned to yield pDM3 and ecoRI, ccdB and mazF were cloned to make the 
toxin variants (see Supplementary Table 1).
Hybrid TF genes (lacI-galR LG36-LG46, galR-lacI, celR-lacI, lacI-scrR, galR-scrR, and 
celR-scrR) were constructed by overlap extension PCR to fuse the environmental sensing 
modules (ESMs) and the DNA recognition modules (DRMs) of the designated genes. The 
hybrid TFs were cloned into pTR, a derivative of pKE2-MCS containing the pLtetO-1 
promoter and T0 terminator from pZA1146, using restriction sites BamHI and BsrGI. 
Transcription from the pLtetO-1 promoter driving TF expression is constitutive because the 
E. coli strains used in this study did not contain tetR. Reporter plasmids (pREPORT) were 
constructed from the plasmid pZA1246, with mcherry or gfp inserted downstream of the 
pLlacO promoter using KpnI and HindIII. To test hybrid TFs that contain the ScrR DRM, 
pLlacO-1 was replaced with pLscrO-1 or pLscrO-2 using Gibson Assembly method44. For 
implementation of both LacI/pLlacO-1 and GalR-ScrR/pLscrO inducible expression systems 
in the same cells (Supplementary Fig. 14), the pLlacO-1-mCherry-T1 cassette was 
subcloned into pTR using restriction sites, NheI and SalI.
The Passcode circuit was developed using a two-plasmid system. Plasmid pPasscode 
(GenBank accession numbers KT895272, KT895273 and KT895274), derived from 
pKE2_MCS17, was constructed to contain the hybrid TF circuit, and pToxin (GenBank 
accession numbers KT895275, KT895276 and KT895277), derived from pZA1246, was 
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constructed to contain the toxin output module under control of the pLscrO promoter. For 
pPasscode, three promoter-hybrid TF-terminator fragments were used to construct each 
hybrid TF circuit version, as listed in Supplementary Table 1. For version 1 of pPasscode 
(pPasscode1), in which LacI-ScrR is used as hybrid C, the promoter pLscrO-2 was utilized 
to control the expression of toxin gene(s) in pToxin. For pPasscode2 that contains GalR-
ScrR, the promoter pLscrO-1 was used for toxin control in pToxin. For pPasscode3 that 
contains CelR-ScrR, the promoter pLscrO-1 was used to control the expression of mf-Lon 
and the promoter pLscrO-2 was used to control the expression of ecoRI. For Passcode 
circuits that contain two toxin gene systems, the DNA fragments pLscrO-mf-Lon-terminator 
and pLscrO-ecoRI-terminator were incorporated into pToxin using Gibson Assembly 
(Supplementary Table 1). For Passcode circuit characterization, pPasscode was first 
transformed into the desired E. coli strain and grown in media containing the “passcode” 
combination of the three inputs (IPTG, galactose and cellobiose). Plasmid pToxin, which 
contains the toxin gene(s), was then transformed into the cells to complete the Passcode 
circuit.
RBS strength optimization for monostable toggle construction
RBS calculator algorithm24 was used to identify RBS variants that produce a range of LacI 
and TetR expressions (Supplementary Table 1). Cells containing each toggle RBS variant 
were grown overnight in the presence of ATc, transferred to media without ATc, and then 
measured for mCherry expression by flow cytometry after 6 hours. Toggle variant 5, which 
showed the largest change in mCherry fluorescence upon loss of ATc, was chosen for use in 
the Deadman circuit (Supplementary Fig. 2). To quantify the relative LacI and TetR 
expression levels, mCherry was fused to the C-terminus of LacI or TetR to yield pBAC-LC 
and pBAC-TC, respectively (GenBank accession numbers KT893256 and KT893257). RBS 
variants for LacI and TetR were then cloned into pBAC-LC and pBAC-TC, respectively, and 
a SpectraMax M5 microplate reader (Molecular Devices) was used to measure mCherry 
fluorescence with excitation and emission wavelengths of 587 nm and 610 nm, respectively, 
with an emission filter cutoff at 610 nm. mCherry fluorescence was normalized to cell 
growth (OD600).
RBS strength optimization for toxin expression
To optimize cell death dynamics upon Deadman or Passcode circuit activation, a range of 
predicted RBS strength variants24 was generated for each toxin (Supplementary Table 1). 
For the Deadman kill switches (Supplementary Fig. 6), RBS variants and the corresponding 
toxin genes ecoRI, ccdB, and mazF, were cloned into pDM2L using Gibson Assembly 
(Supplementary Table 1). Overnight cultures were grown in the presence of ATc and then 
transferred into media with ATc (survival condition) or with IPTG (induced death 
condition). A SpectraMax M5 microplate reader (Molecular Devices) was used to measure 
cell growth (OD600) every 15 min for 15 hours, and the cell growth ratios of the induced 
death state to the survival state were calculated at 15 hours.
For Passcode kill switches, RBS variants (Supplementary Table 1) and the corresponding 
toxin genes ecoRI and mf-lon were cloned into pREPORT to replace gfp and tested for 
optimal expression under regulation by the hybrid TFs LacI-ScrR, GalR-ScrR and CelR-
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ScrR. Plasmids containing each RBS-toxin variant were transformed into cells constitutively 
expressing LacI-ScrR, GalR-ScrR, or CelR-ScrR, grown overnight without inducers, and 
then transferred into media with or without the appropriate inducer (1 mM IPTG, 20 mM 
galactose, or 5 mM cellobiose for cells containing LacI-ScrR, GalR-ScrR, or CelR-ScrR, 
respectively). Cell growth analysis was performed as described for the Deadman circuit 
above, and the cell growth ratio was calculated at 12 hours. Representative data are shown in 
Supplementary Figure 17.
RBS strength optimization for ScrR ESM-containing TFs
A range of RBS variants was tested to optimize the expression of ScrR ESM-containing TFs 
(see TF “C” in Fig. 3a) in the Passcode circuits (Supplementary Table 1). Cells with the 
Passcode circuit harboring RBS variants were transformed with the indicated pToxin 
plasmid, grown overnight under survival conditions (see Supplementary Fig. 16 for the 
appropriate inducers for each circuit), and then transferred to media with all 8 combinations 
of the three inducers (IPTG, galactose, and cellobiose). Performance of each circuit was 
determined by CFU count after 8 hours of exposure as described in the following section.
Survival assays
Colony forming unit (CFU) cell viability assays were used to measure functionality of the 
Deadman and Passcode circuits. Overnight cultures were grown under the survival 
conditions (Deadman: with ATc, Passcode: with survival “passcode” inputs) and were 
transferred into fresh LB medium with or without the survival signal(s). For the Passcode 
circuit, all eight combinations of the three inputs were tested (+/− IPTG, +/− galactose and 
+/− cellobiose). Samples were collected every two hours, serially diluted in PBS over a 7-
log range, and spotted (5 µL) onto a square plate containing LB agar with the appropriate 
survival signal(s). CFU and survival ratios were calculated as previously reported11: 
CFU/mL = (number of colonies) × (dilution factor)/0.005 mL, survival ratio (log10) = log 
{(CFU/mL without the survival signal)/(CFU/mL with the survival signal)}.
Long-term growth analysis
Cells containing the Deadman and Passcode kill switches were passaged under survival 
conditions for 4 days (Deadman: 100 ng/mL ATc; Passcode: unique inducer for each 
Passcode circuit; see Supplementary Fig. 16). Sub-populations of these cells were 
transferred 1:20,000 into media with or without the survival signal(s) (Deadman: no ATc; 
Passcode: no inducers), and samples were collected at 8 hours after inoculation, serially 
diluted 1:10 in PBS over a 7-log range, and spotted (5 µL) onto LB agar plates with the 
appropriate survival signal(s). CFU and survival ratios were calculated as described above.
Escapee genetic analysis
Cells containing independent Deadman and Passcode circuit transformants (n=20 for each 
circuit) were grown under survival conditions (Deadman: 100 ng/mL ATc; Passcode: unique 
inducer for each Passcode circuit; see Supplementary Fig. 16). The cells were then 
transferred to media without the survival signal(s) for 8 hours and then placed on LB agar 
plates containing the appropriate survival signal(s). Deadman circuits were isolated from 
Chan et al. Page 10
Nat Chem Biol. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 June 07.
H
H
M
I A
uthor M
an
u
script
H
H
M
I A
uthor M
an
u
script
H
H
M
I A
uthor M
an
u
script
surviving cells by amplification with Phusion high-fidelity DNA polymerase (NEB), and 
Passcode circuits were isolated by plasmid DNA purification, and the circuits were then 
sequenced by Quintara Biosciences (Boston, MA).
Flow cytometry assay
Cells containing Passcode circuits were grown as described for each experiment, and at the 
appropriate time were fixed in 2% paraformaldehyde in PBS and then diluted 1:10 in PBS 
for analysis. mCherry and GFP fluorescence measurements were performed using a BD 
FACSAriaII (BD Biosciences) or a BD LSRFortessa™ flow cytometer (BD Biosciences). 
Flow cytometry data were gated by forward and side scatter to eliminate multi-cell 
aggregates, and the geometric mean of mCherry and GFP fluorescence distributions were 
calculated using FlowJo software (Treestar). At least 10,000 events were collected for each 
measurement.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1. Deadman kill switch
(a) Deadman circuit control of toxin gene expression. Cell viability was measured by CFU 
count following removal of the survival signal (ATc) and is displayed as a ratio of cells 
without ATc to cells with ATc at each time point. (b) Deadman circuit control of targeted 
essential protein degradation. Inclusion of the mf-lon specific pdt#1 tag on the specified 
essential gene causes mf-Lon-mediated degradation of the essential protein upon Deadman 
circuit activation. (c) Combined control of toxin expression and targeted essential protein 
degradation increases Deadman-induced cell death. In particular, targeted MurC degradation 
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and EcoRI expression reduced cell viability to below the limit of detection (< 1 × 10−7) after 
6 hours (indicated by a “0”). All data points represent mean ± S.D. of three biological 
replicates.
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Figure 2. The fail-safe mechanism for Deadman circuit activation
To demonstrate active control over host cell viability, cells grown under survival conditions 
(with ATc) were exposed to 1 mM IPTG to directly induce EcoRI and mf-Lon expression. 
Cell viability was measured by CFU count and is displayed as a ratio of cell survival with 
and without IPTG at each time point. Data points represent the mean ± S.D. of three 
biological replicates.
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Figure 3. Passcode kill switch
(a) Passcode circuit schematic and logic gate behavior. Cell survival requires the continued 
presence of inputs a and b and the absence of input c. Loss of input a or b or the addition of 
input c cause the passcode circuit to activate toxin expression, leading to cell death. (b) 
Three versions of the Passcode kill switch were used to control expression of ecoRI, mf-lon-
mediated MurC degradation (mf-lon), or both ecoRI and mf-lon. Cells containing each 
circuit were placed in each of eight possible combinations of the three input molecules, and 
cell viability was measured by CFU count after 8 hours. In each condition, cell survival is 
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displayed as a ratio of cells in that condition to cells in the “survival” condition highlighted 
in green. Cell survival below the limit of detection (< 1 × 10−7) is indicated by a “0”. All 
data points represent mean ± S.D. of three biological replicates.
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Figure 4. Long-term circuit stability
(a) and (b) Cells with Deadman or Passcode circuits containing one toxin (EcoRI) or two 
toxins (EcoRI and mf-Lon) were passaged under survival conditions for 4 days, and sub-
populations of cells were periodically switched to nonpermissive media (Deadman: no ATc, 
Passcode: no inducer) for eight hours. The survival ratio is the ratio of cells that survive in 
the death state to those in the survival state. Data points represent the mean ± S.D. of six 
biological replicates. The passcode circuit was also passaged in E. coli MDS42pdu ΔrecA 
(MDS strain), which lacks recombinogenic and mobile genomic elements34. Deadman and 
Passcode circuits that do not contain toxin modules displayed increased stability throughout 
the 4 day experiment (see Supplementary Figs. 20–21). (c) Cells containing Deadman and 
Passcode circuits that survived exposure to their respective death states were isolated, and 
the entire circuit and toxin(s) were sequenced to identify the inactivating mutations. Toxin 
gene disruption by genome-encoded insertion-sequence (IS) elements and large deletions 
were the predominant cause of circuit inactivation. In the two-toxin Deadman circuit, 
inactivating TetR mutations allowed continued LacI expression and repression of toxin genes 
in non-biocontainment conditions (see Fig. 1 for a visual aid).
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